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Escrow agent’s duty of care to nonparties: 
Summit Fin. Holdings v Continental Lawyers Title,(2001 
Roger Bernhardt 
 
Escrow holder that follows principal’s escrow instructions owes no duty of care to 
nonparties to the escrow. 
Summit Fin. Holdings, Ltd. v Continental Lawyers Title Co. (2001) 87 CA4th 1379, 105 CR2d 
352 
Talbert Financial (Talbert) made a $425,000 loan secured by a deed of trust, which Talbert 
immediately assigned to Summit Financial Holdings (Summit). Talbert recorded the assignment 
of the deed of trust, but neither Talbert nor Summit notified the borrower of the assignment, as 
required by CC §2937. A year later, the borrower refinanced the loan—i.e., paid off the loan 
with the proceeds of a new loan—using a title company s escrow holder. Summit was not a 
party to the escrow. The title company prepared a preliminary title report showing the Talbert 
deed of trust and the assignment from Talbert to Summit. Talbert submitted a payoff demand 
requesting that payment be made to Talbert (not Summit), and the parties to the escrow 
instructed the title company to pay off the loan by issuing a check to Talbert. At close of escrow, 
the title company paid Talbert in accordance with those instructions. Talbert did not remit the 
funds to Summit, in breach of their assignment agreement.  
The borrower later filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. In connection with a sale of the 
borrower’s property free of liens, the bankruptcy court disallowed Summit’s lien on the ground 
that the payoff to Talbert in the refinancing extinguished the borrower’s obligations under the 
original loan. Summit then sued the title company for negligence, claiming that the title company 
should have issued the payoff check to Summit instead of Talbert because it knew of the 
assignment. Relying on Kirby v Palos Verdes Escrow Co. (1986) 183 CA3d 57, 227 CR 785, the 
trial court held that the title company owed a duty of care to Summit, even though Summit was 
not a party to the escrow, and breached that duty by paying Talbert instead of Summit. 
The court of appeal reversed, holding that the titl company did not owe a duty of care to 
Summit. An escrow holder’s primary duty is to strictly perform the instructions of the parties to 
the escrow. The court held that an escrow holder that follows its principals’ instructions cannot 
be liable in negligence to a nonparty stranger to the escrow. The court disagreed with Kirby’s 
holding to the contrary, stating that Kirby was wrongly decided and should not be followed. 
Instead, the court followed the general rule that an escrow holder is not liable for failing to do 
something not required by the escrow instructions, r for a loss caused by following the escrow 
instructions. 
The borrower and the new lender engaged the title company to assist in closing the new loan, 
and any effect of that transaction on Summit was collateral to the purpose of the escrow. The title 
company could not have foreseen that Talbert would breach its obligation to disburse the funds 
to Summit. Moreover, Summit caused its own injury by failing to notify the borrower of the 
assignment as required by CC §2937. Finally, “imposing a duty here would have the anomalous 
effect that the original debtor is exonerated from liability on his debt by his agent’s payment to 
Talbert but the agent making that payment for its principal becomes liable on that debt.” 87 
CA4th at 1390. For these reasons, the court found no basis for permitting Summit to recover 
from the title company. 
THE EDITOR’S TAKE: [Note: Feeling slightly uncertain about what I said below, I sent a 
draft of this comment to my colleague, Professor Dale Whitman of the University of Missouri, 
who is the author of the article I cite below, as well as the Reporter for the recent Restatement of 
Mortgages. His response was so interesting that I have inserted it below, in brackets, as 
counterpoint to my remarks. RB]  
Although the rule announced by the court is clear, I find the circumstances for its application 
somewhat confusing.  
First, as to the underlying bankruptcy litigation and the liability of the borrower, I don’t know 
what CC §2937 had to do with the matter. That code section requires that notice of transfer of 
servicing of a debt on one-to-four residential units be given to the borrower. Assuming that this 
was that kind of property, I don’t see that any transfer of servicing was involved. There is no 
mention of any servicing agent at all, and the note calls for direct payments to the payee. That 
should put the assignment of that note under CC §2935, which deals with assignments of the 
note and mortgage, rather than under §2937. But §2935 concentrates not on whether actual 
notice was given, but on whether the payment was made “to the person holding such note,” and 
that fact is not told to us. 
[Prof. Whitman: I agree with you. The term “transfer of servicing” is routinely understood in 
the mortgage banking industry to mean a transfer of only the servicing rights, and not an 
assignment of the underlying obligation (note). Of course, the “evil” that the legislature refers to 
in the introduction to §2937 is equally a problem when the note itself is transferred with no 
notice to the obligor. So it would have made sense for §2937 to define “transfer of servicing,” 
and to define it broadly enough to include assignmet of the obligation. But the legislature didn’t 
provide any definition at all, and in this situation I think a court would have to accept the 
ordinary understanding of the term in the industry. Incidentally, §2937 isn’t unique: federal law 
also requires notification of the borrower when servicing is transferred. See 12 USC §2605, 
adopted by Congress in 1990 as part of the Real Estte Settlement Procedures Act of 1974 
(RESPA). But the annotations to that section, likewis , give no indication that “transfer of 
servicing” would be construed to include transfer of the obligation itself.] 
Civil Code §2937 has never been interpreted, and may have been intended to displace §2935 
entirely when small residential properties are involved. If so, the debtor may safely continue to 
pay his original creditor no matter how many times the actual note and deed of trust have been 
transferred and the transfers recorded, so long as he has never received the required statutory 
notice. For other properties, §2935 would still apply, meaning that a debtor should still require 
her creditor to produce the note to prove that he still has it before she pays him (the infamous 
“payment rule”). See Whitman, Reforming the Law: The Payment Rule as a Paradigm, 1998 
BYU L Rev 1169. And, because an assignment of a single-family mortgage note might not 
constitute a transfer of its “servicing,” I think that is good advice in any case. It may not be 
realistic to expect debtors to require production of the note regularly, and the risk of loss is small 
when a reputable lending institution is involved, but it can avoid a painful loss.  
[Prof. Whitman: Although the opinion never mentions any servicing agent, that doesn’t mean 
there wasn’t one. Noninstitutional lenders routinely use them. But even if there was a servicing 
agent, there is not the slightest indication that (1) the servicing was transferred, or (2) the transfer 
of any servicing had anything to do with the problem that arose in the case.] 
Second, as to the escrow agent’s behavior, on what basis did it honor Talbert’s (the 
creditor/assignor’s) payoff demand? It is unlikely that it would send Talbert the money without 
requiring Talbert to surrender the note (marked “paid”) and the deed of trust (for reconveyance). 
If that actually happened, the note and deed of trust would still be valid but for §2937. It is more 
likely that the escrow agent did receive these documents from Talbert, which means that Talbert 
retained them despite the assignment to Summit. If so, then Summit brought the loss on itself 
regardless of which code section applies: under §2937 it gave no notice to the borrower, and 
under §2935, its failure to take possession of the note made its recording of the assignment 
ineffectual.  
[Prof. Whitman: We’re only speculating, but I would bet that (contrary to your supposition) 
the title company did indeed send the payoff check to Talbert without requiring him to produce 
the note first. Escrow companies and other closers n arly always do so, in my observation. If 
your supposition is correct, and if Talbert did indee  retain the note, then if the note was 
negotiable under Article 3 of the Uniform Commercial Code [in California, Division 3 of the 
California Commercial Code], the right to payment was not legally and effectively transferred to 
Summit, and the title company did nothing that could be remotely construed as wrong. However, 
if my supposition is correct, then the title company was indeed negligent. Moreover, the title 
company had already issued a preliminary title repot showing the assignment of the mortgage. 
In all probability, a copy of that title report was ctually in the hands of the escrow officer. Under 
these circumstances, even someone like me who believes the payment rule is wrong and ought to 
be changed would be hard-pressed to exonerate the escrow officer. I bet he had actual knowledge 
that he was sending the check to the wrong party.] 
Whether or not the escrow agent owed a duty of careto Summit or fell below that duty, it 
seems clear to me that Summit itself was pretty careless. —Roger Bernhardt (and Dale 
Whitman) 
 
